tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36235418.post117225451274245476..comments2022-11-14T06:40:41.662-08:00Comments on Tractatus Blogico-Philosophicus: DRhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08332954000692559637noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36235418.post-1172596273569605672007-02-27T09:11:00.000-08:002007-02-27T09:11:00.000-08:00Thanks, I think that is helpful.Thanks, I think that is helpful.DRhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08332954000692559637noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36235418.post-1172594401748839342007-02-27T08:40:00.000-08:002007-02-27T08:40:00.000-08:00I think Black is instructive here:"The non-verbal ...I think Black is instructive here:<BR/><BR/>"The non-verbal counterpart of a contingently true statement (a fact) cannot be designated, either by a name or by a description in Russell's sense. For assume, as Wittgenstein did, that every name, simple or complex, must have what he later called a 'bearer' (Investigations, ยง40), i.e. something that actually exists. If a whole sentence were a name (as Frege thought), it could not have a meaning unless the corresponding bearer existed, i.e., unless there were a corresponding fact." (<I>Companion</I>, 33)<BR/><BR/>In other words, a name is of an object, i.e., that's just what it is to be a name. If states of affairs were nameable, then they would (<I>per impossible</I>) be complex objects. Given that objects necessarily exist, if sentences were complex names of complex objects, then every sentence would be necessarily true.N. N.https://www.blogger.com/profile/05983492370711591794noreply@blogger.com