2.06 The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.
(We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, their non-existence a negative one.)
Cf. 1.12. So there are negative facts, or at least “we” say there are, or reserve that name for something. The question of the relation between “the world” and “reality” comes up here. Ostrow (p. 34): “It is, it would seem, some version of the ancient problem of the nature of “what is not” that confronts us at the close of the 2.06s.” On this, see Anscombe (p. 13, footnote): “cf. Plato’s Theaetetus 189A: ‘In judging, one judges something; in judging something, one judges something real; so in judging something unreal one judges nothing; but judging nothing, one is not judging at all.’ Wittgenstein returned to the problem presented by this argument again and again throughout his life.”