6.113 It is the peculiar characteristic of logical propositions that one can perceive from the symbol alone that they are true, and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And thus it is also one of the most important facts, that the truth or falsehood of non-logical propositions cannot be perceived from the proposition alone.

Logic says nothing about the world, it is all (?) a matter of arbitrary conventions. Other propositions are of a wholly different kind and cannot be known a priori. Is this what he is saying? Is this the whole of the philosophy of logic, the whole message of the Tractatus?

Now, how can a tautology be true, given 4.06? Proops argues that he means ‘true’ “only in an honorary sense.” (p. 4, note 38). After all, at 6.125 he puts ‘true’ in scare quotes, and in his Notes to G. E. Moore he says that “logical propositions are neither true nor false” and refers to “what is called the truth of a logical proposition.” (Notebooks p. 109 and p. 108, quoted in Proops.)