Monday, November 19, 2007

6.111 Theories that allow a proposition of logic to seem have content are always false. One could e.g. believe that the words “true” and “false” signify two properties among other properties, and then it would seem a remarkable fact that every proposition possesses one of these properties. This now seems [would then seem] to be anything but self-evident, just as little self-evident as the proposition “All roses are either yellow or red” would sound, even if it were true. Indeed, every proposition now takes on completely the character of a natural scientific proposition and this is a sure sign that it has been falsely understood.

Here again we have logic versus metaphysics, clearly stated for once.

Proops (p. 1) notes that here and in 6.112, 6.1231, and 6.13, Wittgenstein rejects the universalist conception of logic, according to which “logic is a theory of the most general features of reality,” (Proops, p. 1) which he found in Frege and Russell.

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